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In recent extensions of the Darwinian paradigm into economics, the replicator-interactor dual-
ity looms large. I propose a strictly naturalistic approach to this duality in the context of the 
theory of institutions, which means that its use is seen as being always and necessarily de-
pendent on identifying a physical realization. I introduce a general framework for the analysis 
of institutions, which synthesizes Searle’s and Aoki’s theories, especially with regard to the 
role of public representations (signs) in the coordination of actions, and the function of cogni-
tive processes that underly rule-following as a behavioral disposition. This allows to conceive 
institutions as causal circuits that connect the population-level dynamics of interactions with 
cognitive phenomena on the individual level. Those cognitive phenomena ultimately root in 
neuronal structures. So, I draw on a critical restatement of the concept of the ‘meme’ by 
Aunger to propose a new conceptualization of the replicator in the context of institutions, 
namely, the replicator is a causal conjunction between signs and neuronal structures which 
undergirds the dispositions that generate rule-following actions. Signs, in turn, are outcomes 
of population-level interactions. I apply this framework on the case of money, analyzing the 
emotions that go along with the use of money, and presenting a stylized account of the emer-
gence of money in terms of the naturalized Searle-Aoki model. In this view, money is a neu-
ronally anchored metaphor for emotions relating with social exchange and reciprocity. Money 
as a meme is physically realized in a replicator which is a causal conjunction of money arte-
facts and money emotions.  
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1  Introducing naturalism into the evolutionary approach to institutions 
One of the major challenges in generalizing the theory of evolution is to include human cul-
ture and institutions into the picture. In economics, this research agenda has been launched by 
Thorstein Veblen (1899) for the first time and was lost out of sight even in the so-called ‘Old 
Institutionalism’, after the cultural turn triggered by the strong impact of American pragma-
tism. The co-evolution of human biology and culture received considerable attention in an-
thropology and biology after sociobiology had attacked the foundations of the social sciences 
and humanities as independent research traditions. Meanwhile, different approaches to gene-
culture evolution are at hand which avoid fully-fledged reductionism but also extend the evo-
lutionary concepts into the realm of culture (e.g. Richerson and Boyd 2005; Jablonka and 
Lamb 2006). In economics, unified approaches are only back on the research agenda with the 
recent claims of a Universal Darwinism (Hodgson and Knudsen 2010).  
One fundamental conceptual problem in all these extensions is the question of ontology, in 
the specific sense of social ontology. The major ontological difference between old and new 
institutionalism in economics lies in the much richer social ontology of the former, especially 
in accepting institutions as ‘real’, i.e. as ‘facts’, whereas new institutionalisms mostly follow 
the standard assumption of methodological individualism in economics, which would only 
treat ‘individuals’ as ‘real’ units of larger social systems. For evolutionary approaches and 
Darwinism in particular, this applies as well, in the context of the tensions between claims of 
genetic reductionism and the possible role of alternative approaches which would highlight 
the role of higher-level units in evolution. I reduce these complexities to one question: Can we 
construct an extension of evolutionary theory that treats institutions as units of evolution? 
This question would lead to a number of other questions, which I just notice, but cannot pur-
sue in this paper (for more, see Herrmann-Pillath 2010/11), such as: Could we possibly imag-
ine an evolutionary theory in which human individuals emerge as a phenomenon at the inter-
face of two different ontological levels of evolution, i.e. genetic and institutional? Can we 
analyze evolution in the context of human beings in terms of complex interactions of different 
ontological domains of evolution, i.e. biological, cultural, and even individual? 
In this paper, I present an argument in favour of treating institutions as ‘real’ and as units of 
evolution on an ontological level which is independent from the genetic level. As such, the Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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paper picks up a distinction which is currently seen as obsolete by the vast majority of re-
searchers, namely the distinction between genes and memes, which was posited in one early 
universalization of Darwinism by Dawkins (1989). One reason is that defining the concept of 
the ‘meme’ faces the same difficulties as recent generalizations of another Dawkins concept, 
that  underlies  the  notion  of  meme,  i.e.  the  ‘replicator’  (Knudsen  2002;  Hull  and  Wilkins 
2005).  This  is  the  question  of  the  physical  realization  of  the  replicator  beyond  chemical 
mechanisms such as genetics. I argue that this empirical question is in fact an ontological one, 
which implies that we can develop a number of principled ideas about the structure of reality 
that would also enable us to formulate hypotheses about the physical nature of replicators in 
the domain of institutions. 
I will put together different theoretical resources from different disciplines to offer my solu-
tion to this quandary. There is one pivotal point that I make in following John Searle’s (1995, 
2005, 2010) approach to social ontology. This is that institutions are a special kind of facts, 
namely observer-relative facts. Being facts, however, they are conceived in naturalistic terms, 
i.e. as having autonomous causal powers beyond the beliefs and attitudes of individuals who 
act in a certain institutional setting (Bhaskar 1989). The question is how we can empirically 
specify this status of institutions as facts. In answering this question, I go far beyond Searle’s 
approach. I wish to present a conceptual framework for the Darwinian analysis of institutions 
and present an application on one of the most important institutions of the economy, money. 
This framework builds on two ideas borrowed from the literature.  
The first starts out from Aunger’s (2002) theory of (neuro)memes. Aunger, too, posits that 
one of the intricate questions of the generalization of Darwinism is the distinction between 
replicators and interactors. Although it is possible to make sense of this distinction in purely 
information-theoretic terms (as in Hodgson and Knudsen 2010), this approach is methodol-
ogically problematic because it implicitly gives up the naturalistic ontology underlying Dar-
winism. In fact, the purely information-theoretic approach is a disguised Cartesian substance 
dualism of mind vs. matter which builds the universalization of the theory on the distinction 
between a material domain, where biology reigns, and an abstract domain of ‘information’, in 
which the generalization holds. Instead of this, I present an entirely naturalistic account of 
institutions in relation with the replicator/interactor distinction. I define naturalism as the on-
tological hypothesis that the world is physically closed in causal terms, thus eschewing any Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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sort of substance dualism, and that therefore ‘existence’ is defined in terms of physical causal 
powers (Papineau 2007). Naturalism does not preclude the possibility of emergence, i.e. onto-
logical novelty  (Bunge  1977/1979), that means,  I propose  a non-reductionist evolutionary 
account of institutions (in the sense of Hodgson 1999). As Aunger has shown, in the generali-
zation of Darwinism, naturalism requires to focus on the causal circuitry between artefacts 
and neuronal structures as the physical realization of replicator functions in the context of 
human culture and institutions. I argue that this is necessary to justify an assumption that was 
central to Old Institutionalism, namely that institutions are facts in the modern sense of social 
ontology. So, the first central claim of this paper is that if we want to treat institutions as rep-
licators, we have to conceive them in naturalistic terms, i.e. as causal conjunctions between 
artefacts and neuronal states, which are both physical phenomena. Then, one central question 
is how we can understand the causality between artefacts and neuronal states in terms of 
Searle’s notion of observer-relativity: In Searle’s approach, the institutional nature of an arte-
fact results from its being interpreted by an observer in a particular way: A piece of paper is 
treated ‘as money’. On first sight, this interpretive relation seems to be substantially different 
from the causal relation between the artefact and neuronal states (which, of course, just re-
states the Diltheyian fundamental distinction between ‘Erklären’ und ‘Verstehen’, i.e. the sci-
ences and the humanities). My solution to this problem is to synthesize the categories of 
‘meaning’ and ‘function’ in an evolutionary account of institutions. This synthesis starts out 
from the recent ‘cognitive turn’ in institutional economics (e.g. North 1990, 2005), which sees 
institutions as combinations of incentive mechanisms and cognitive schemes (mental models 
etc.).  
I present a detailed proposal on how to conceptualize replicators in the context of cognitive 
theories of institutions, taking Aoki’s (2007, 2011) approach as a workhorse. Aoki has shown 
that for the emergence and sustainability of institutions a specific kind of causal circuitry be-
tween external artefacts (his ‘public representations’) and states of individuals (his ‘beliefs’) 
is essential. This causal circuity mediates between individual-level and population level proc-
esses. I show that this view can be translated into purely naturalistic terms, which eventually 
allows to treat institutions as memes in the sense of Aunger’s. As a side effect, my argument 
points toward a lacuna in recent debates in evolutionary economics, namely the integration of 
the brain sciences and recent progress in neuroeconomics. So, I propose an extension of the Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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cognitive approach to institutions into a neurocognitive foundation, following recent theories 
about ‘grounded cognition’ and related approaches (e.g. Barsalou 1999, Pecher and Zwaan 
2005). As I will show, this applies for both the behavioral regularities that are implied by rule-
following, and to the interpretive activities. Naturalism claims that all these different phenom-
ena are ultimately states of the brain as a physical entity. However, the complete evolutionary 
framework puts these phenomena into a direct causal relation with what Aunger calls ‘arte-
facts’ and Aoki ‘public representations’. I propose to indicate this synthesis by using the term 
‘sign’ for both. The meaning of signs rests in the function that the realize in the entire evolu-
tionary causal circuitry. 
In emphasizing the pivotal role of these approaches in a generalized Darwinian argument, I 
basically follow the example of Hayek, who had put the analysis of the brain at the center of 
his  entire  approach  to  institutions,  starting  out  from  his  seminal  ‘Sensory  Order’  (Hayek 
1952). As a result, I argue that the evolution of human behavior takes place at the interface of 
two levels of evolutionary processes, namely the evolution of states of the brain (Neuronal 
Darwinism) and the evolution of signs in the most general sense. These two processes connect 
with the process of genetic evolution via epigenetic mechanisms and the phylogenetic heri-
tage of value functions that guide human learning in an institutional context.  
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Hence, my argument will operate on two levels, namely the level of the brain and the level of 
signs (fig. 1). In this framework, I expand and complement Searle’s approach in two ways, so 
that I can relate it with a Generalized Darwinian replicator/interactor model. This is possible, 
if, following Hayek, we conceive the human brain as an evolutionary system that is physically 
autonomous from the level of genetic evolution. This approach has been seminally elaborated 
by Gary  Edelman (1987, 2005) in a paradigmatic way. The linkage between this  general 
framework and Searle’s social ontology can be established in a two-fold way. Searle has put a 
fundamental cognitive process at the center of his explanation of the emergence of institu-
tions, which is the so-called status function. Status functions are metaphors in the broadest 
sense, such as when treating a piece of metal ‘as money’. In other words, certain cognitive 
capacities are indispensible in producing the new functionings that become possible with the 
emergence of a new institution. Thus, I give an exemplary account of these capacities by sim-
ply referring to two lead theories in the field, one on the purely cognitive level of concept 
formation  underlying  institutions,  which  is  Fauconnier  and  Turner’s  theory  of  conceptual 
blending, and the other Lakoff’s neuronal theory of metaphor. Both theories harmonize well 
with the more fundamental evolutionary approach of Edelman, in my view. 
The other analytical level that I introduce is the level of external artefacts, i.e. signs. That is, I 
adopt an externalist position in analyzing mental phenomena. This is essential to develop on a 
modern version of Veblen’s notion of ‘habits of thought’ undergirding institutions. I present a 
most  general  externalist  model  of  Edelman’s  theory  which  follows  Aunger’s  theory  of 
memes. This linkage can be referred back to Searle’s theory, if we highlight one of Searle’s 
ideas that has not been fully developed by himself, namely that following an institution is a 
disposition, and not a conscious act, and that these dispositions can be analyzed in naturalistic 
terms, i.e. as neurophysiological dispositions, i.e. states of the brain as a physical system. 
Then, it is straightforward to realize that institutions can be conceived as causal conjunctions 
of neuronal states and signs that trigger certain dispositions that result into behavioral regu-
larities which can be described in terms of the institution. I will propose that this causal con-
junction can be specified further in terms of the conjunction of signs and emotions, with the 
latter being complex neuronal structures which coordinate valuations and sensorimotoric ou-
puts.  As  I  have  argued  elsewhere  (Herrmann-Pillath  2010,  2012),  this  results  into  rule-
following being a performative action in the sense of speech-act theory, i.e. through the action Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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the rule comes into existence. The entire argument boils down to a simple empirical proposi-
tion: All institutions build on causal conjunctions between evolving artefacts and brain states, 
resulting into behavior that shows the feature of following the institution. 
This model remains on a highly abstract level. Following Herrmann-Pillath (2012) I offer a 
more detailed empirical interpretation in adding Aoki’s theory of institutions. As stated above, 
Aoki analyzes institutions in terms of a specific causal circuitry that relates interactions under 
the institution with external sets of public representations, which have the essential function 
of ‘information  compression’. With this idea, he  grasps  another important element of the 
Hayekian tradition in understanding institutions, namely that institutions are mechanisms of 
distributing knowledge, hence carriers of information. This idea matches exactly with the in-
formation-theoretic interpretation of the replicator/interactor duality. In Aoki’s conceptualiza-
tion, the signs have the function of information compression, and they generate certain dispo-
sitions that result into actions which reproduce certain behavioral regularities as well as the 
public representations. If we recognize the conceptual equivalence between this notion and 
the  notion  of  artefacts  in  the  more  abstract  framework,  it  is  straightforward  to  identify 
Aunger’s neuromemes with causal conjunctions of signs and dispositions in the Aoki model. 
Thus, we get an empirical interpretation of the general replicator function in the context of a 
fully fledged evolutionary approach to institutions. The replicator is a conjunction of signs 
and neuronal states, and the interactor is the resulting behavior, however in terms of its aggre-
gate, population level patterns, i.e. the ‘states of play’ in Aoki’s sense. This analysis catches 
the important fact that both the interactor and the replicator must be population-level phenom-
ena, such as in the classical distinction between the genotype and the phenotype (Lewontin 
2007). Even though the neuronal states are strictly individual, the signs are population level 
phenomena, and their functional relation depends on the sustainability of collective behavioral 
patterns in the population of agents.   
Thus, in summary, I present a Darwinian account of institutions that interprets institutions in 
terms of the replicator-interactor duality. The interactor is the pattern of sustainable behav-
ioral regularities on the population level. The replicator is a stable conjunction of signs, which 
are generated on the population level, and emotions qua neuronal states on the individual 
level. The replicator connects sings and individual behavioral dispositions, such that meaning 
of the signs is the function that it has in sustaining the population-level patterns. Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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The paper proceeds as follows. I section two, I present an detailed account of the theory 
sketched so far. In section three, I apply this theory on the institution of money, adding to-
gether three different sources of insights, first, the empirical record of the role of emotions in 
the use of money, second, a specific proposal by Lea and Webley (2006) about the core emo-
tion that undergirds the use of money, which I interpret in Darwinian terms, and third, a con-
ceptual model of the historical emergence of coins presented by Hutter (1994), which I ana-
lyze in terms of Searle’s status function. As a result, I claim to show that money is a meme. 
Section four summarizes the argument by means of looking at the larger research agenda of a 
naturalistic theory of institutions. 
2  Institutions, distributed cognition and neuromemes: Outline of a natu-
ralistic approach to institutions 
In this section I develop the theoretical framework in more detail. I will relate different theo-
retical resources, which also implies that I present my own interpretations of these contribu-
tions. This is especially true for the pivotal theory, Searle’s theory of institutions. Without 
being able to go into the details here, I will introduce many of Searle’s concepts, but impose a 
strictly naturalistic interpretation. Searle himself is also  arguing in naturalistic terms  (e.g. 
Searle 2004), but also maintains what I call a mentalistic approach, or, in other words, inter-
nalism with regard to mind. This is the main reason why he changed some terminologies in 
his recent 2010 book, compared with his 1995 book, which I follow more closely. Especially, 
I focus on one notion that has been retreating in Searle’s own work recently, which is the 
‘background’. The background is a set of enabling capacities of agents, which makes rule 
following possible. My central concern is whether these capacities require mental representa-
tions. In my argument, which departs from Searle’s work, especially the more recent one, I 
focus on one of his (1995) ideas that is important but remains peripheral, namely that the 
background generates behavioral dispositions. This idea I will relate with another theory of 
institutions in economics, which I find congenial to Searle’s approach, namely Aoki’s, espe-
cially in its most recent versions. For Aoki’s approach, too, I develop a naturalistic account, 
and I will show that the linkage between the two theories rests on the notion of a functional 
causal  circuitry,  mediated  via  language  and  dispositions,  such  that  institutions  emerge  as 
population-level  regularities  in  behavioral  patterns.  This  ideas  prepare  the  ground  for  an 
analysis in terms of the replicator-interactor duality. Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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2.1  Institutions  and  functions  in  evolutionary  causal  circuitry:  Merging 
Searle’s and Aoki’s theories of institutions 
Searle (1995: 129ff.; compare Searle 2004) argues that institutionalized behavior builds on 
behavioral dispositions, which are neurophysiologically anchored. Following a rule does not 
require to know the rule as such, so there is no need for a fully fledged mental representation. 
It suffices to be able to process environmental cues which trigger neurophysiological reac-
tions that produce the required behavior. Thus, in this view institutions are not fully reflected 
in cognitive models, but in complex conjunctions of partial cognitive representations and neu-
rophysiological mechanisms. This viewpoint seems to be complementary to Aoki’s (2001) 
notion of the stabilization of institutions by summary representations of the underlying game 
structures. Summary representations are partial cognitive models which do not need to be 
shared in a population, but still form part and parcel of the reproduction of the institution by 
means of coordinated behavior, as long as pay-offs stabilize the different summary representa-
tions.  
In this elaborating on this model, Aoki (2007, 2011) starts to introduce the notion of ‘substan-
tive institutions’. This compares with the mentalism of many theories about institutions, espe-
cially in game theory. Mentalism approaches institutions as coordinated states of mind be-
tween  individuals,  especially  in  the  sense  of  mutually  confirming  expectations,  based  on 
common knowledge. To the contrary, substantive institutions are external determinants of 
mental states, i.e. beliefs. I argue that this approach can be directly connected to Searle’s the-
ory of institutions as facts, which is in turn based on a theory of functions. The theory of func-
tions is central to understand the replicator-interactor relationship in the complete model that I 
propose. 
Searle puts his theory in the broader context of a general theory of facts (Searle 1995: 120ff.). 
He  distinguishes  between  observer  independent  and  observer  relative  facts  (in  2010,  he 
changes the terminology from ‘observer’ to ‘mind’, which I do not follow). A metal coin is a 
piece of metal, which is observer independent. But the function as money is entirely depend-
ent on the observer, hence observer relative. It is important to notice that Searle advances a 
very broad notion of observer relativity, because he assigns the status of an observer relative 
fact to all functions. That is, the function of a heart, namely to pump blood, is also an observer 
relative fact. Observer relativity ultimately roots in collective intentionality. This is a crucial Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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step, if we further consider that Searle distinguishes between two kinds of the subjective / 
objective distinction, i.e. the ontological one, referring to facts about entities, and the episte-
mological one, referring to judgments about facts (see table 1). A fact can be ontologically 
subjective and epistemologically objective, such as in case of a technological artefact, which 
is observer relative, but the functioning of which follows physical laws. On the other hand, 
there can be ontologically objective facts which are epistemologically subjective, such as the 
so-called qualia, i.e. inner perceptions of feelings, which are physical states of the brain, but 
nevertheless cannnot be directly accessed by outside observers. From these distinctions, it 
becomes clear that institutions, which build on brute facts, are ontologically subjective but 
epistemologically objective. So, money is a part of an ontology which is observer relative, but 
its functionings can be analyzed by objective epistemic tools, such as the quantity theory of 
money. 
Table 1: Types of facts and examples 
  judgement 
entity 
Epistemically subjective  Epistemically objective 
Ontologically subjective  Subjective fact  Institutional fact 
Ontologically objective  psychoneural fact (qualia)  Biological fact 
 
There are further important distinctions, especially between agentive and non-agentive func-
tions, and, on the level of institutions, regulatory and constitutive ones. Agentive functions 
involve intentional agents not only in the ascription of the function, but also in its workings. 
That is, the function of my heart is non-agentive because its works independent from my in-
tention. If I use money, the function depends me and all other agents who agree to use money. 
However, in institutional analysis many functions are also non-agentive, if there are also col-
lectively unintended consequences which might be only perceivable to the external observer. 
In the standard view, institutions are regarded to be agentive functions. They can be only 
regulatory, which means, the refer to an pre-existing field of activity, such as institutions gov-
erning the exploitation of fish resources. Constitutive institutions create the very activity that 
is governed by the institution, as in the case of a financial market. As we shall see, money can 
be regarded as a constitutive institution in the case of modern money, whereas the transition 
from pure commodity money to coins starts out from regulatory institutions. Further, agentive Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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functions can result into states in which the process of collective intentionality actually re-
treats into the ‘background’, such as when coins as money are taken for granted. This implies 
a shift from agentive to non-agentive functions. Actually, we can state that in the evolution of 
institutions, the transformation from agentive to non-agentive functions is the essential proc-
ess  in  the  general  phenomenon  of  institutional  scaffolding  of  individual  behavior  (North 
2005). 
This analysis is essential to develop on a radicalization of Aoki’s theory (for more detail, see 
Herrmann-Pillath 2012). This is because in Aoki’s original argument, deployed in 2007 and 
2011, there are still some traces of mentalism in two senses. One is that the public representa-
tions are seen in terms of a semantics of representation (survey in Lycan 1999), and the other 
is that they still generate beliefs qua mental states. I propose to substitute this with a func-
tional  semantics  which  follows  recent  developments  in  teleosemantics  (overview  in  Mac-
Donald and Papineau 2006; compare Millikan 2005). This means to analyze the public repre-
sentations exclusively in terms of their causal effects in the causal circuitry of institutions. To 
indicate this change of perspective, I use the term ‘sign’ instead of ‘public representations’, 
also following recent developments in game theory (e.g. Skyrms 2004, 2010). A sign does not 
represent a state of play, but has a function, which consists of triggering certain responses by 
the agents that in turn support those states of play dynamically, which includes the production 
of those signs. This causal circuitry is the ontological feature that justifies to treat institutions 
as facts.  
Hence, I introduce a radically naturalistic approach in making the function independent from 
mental states of the agents, in the particular sense that at least the major aspect of institutions 
lies on the population level interactions, which renders them into non-agentive functions par-
tially. Treating institutions as combinations of agentive with non-agentive functions grasps 
the Aoki concept of information compression, i.e. there can be no full assignment of functions 
by  any  purely  internal  mental  states  of  observers  because  they  are  lacking  the  necessary 
knowledge of doing that. In other words, following an institution is normally based on a cer-
tain understanding of an institution, but also includes many unintended effects which are es-
sential for the functioning of the institution, and which enable the generic function of informa-
tion compression. This also catches the Hayekian idea of distributed knowledge, which we 
can translate into the more recent term of distributed cognition. As a consequence, we can no Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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longer reduce institutions to internal mental states. To the contrary, the entire causal circuitry 
of the revised Aoki model describes an externalist approach to institutions, which allows to 
argue that via the institutions cognitive functions are externalized on population level proc-
esses. 
I summarize the revised Aoki model in fig. 2. This keeps the distinction between the individ-
ual(micro) and the aggregate population(macro) level, but changes the original orthogonal 
distinction between the behavioral and the cognitive level into the two notions of distributed 
cognition and performativity, which actually connect the individual with the macrolevel (indi-
cated by the diagonal). I also maintain the idea that there are strategic interactions in popula-
tions  which  can  be  analyzed  by  different  tools  familiar  from  game  theory  and  other  ap-
proaches in economics and complex systems sciences. The interactions result into states of 
play which include the generation of signs or sign systems. These are artefacts which may be 
partly produced intentionally, but their functioning in the causal circuitry does not rely on this 
property. This is essential to understand the role of signs in processes of distributed cognition. 
The signs produce causal effects that are mediated via neuronal structures of the agents. Thus, 
I merge the two notions of function and meaning in the sense that the meaning of the sign is 
its function relative to the neuronal states of the agents. As I will show subsequently, this 
function is analyzed in terms of recent approaches in neurolinguistics and the theory of con-
cept formation. The neuronal states create dispositions to act, again, without the essential re-
quirement of consciously reflected choices. Dispositions cause actions within a certain range 
of random variation, which renders the entire model evolutionary in the Darwinian sense. The 
actions of different agents play together on the population level, producing certain aggregate 
results, possibly including the reproduction of the sign systems. Thus, in case of sustainability 
we can say that the function of the signs is the maintainance of the behavioral regularities. 
This is reflected in a twofold merger of the individual, micro-level phenomena, and the ag-
gregate macro-level phenomena: First, cognitive functions are distributed across individual 
neuronal states and sign systems on the population level, and second, because of the causal 
relation between signs and dispositions, I argue that the actions become performative in the 
sense that rule-based behavior emerges in which the individual actions anticipate the collec-
tive-level results within a certain range that suffices to reproduce them. In this view, collec-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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tive intentionality in the sense of Searle’s is supervening on the causal conjunction between 
signs and dispositions. 
Figure 2: The Aoki model of institutions, naturalized 
It is important to notice already at this stage that this circular causal structure allows to grasp 
certain essential aspects of the replicator-interactor duality. This is because on the level of 
populations, the emergent patterns of behavior are stabilized via the pay-offs, which are in 
turn related to exogenous determinants, in particular states of nature. Hence, we can say that 
those behavioral patterns correspond to the interactor. On the other hand, the patterns are gen-
erated by the causal conjunction of signs and neuronal states, which do not fully reflect the 
entire information that is embodied on the interactor level. In this sense, the causal conjunc-
tions have the function of the replicator. The stability of the replicator rests upon the fact that 
it is partly insulated from the direct environmental impacts, precisely because it represents a 
state of information compression. Since individual behavior results from dispositions, these 
can manifest evolutionary stasis, in spite of generating individual behavioral variants stochas-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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tically. Yet, if on the population level patterns emerge that lead to a change of signs that also 
alter the causal conjunctions with those dispositions, evolutionary change becomes possible, 
ultimately conceivable as a series of mutations on the replicator level. 
2.2  Status functions and the neuronal theory of metaphor: Establishing the 
larger framework of Neuronal Darwinism 
To complete this argument, we only need to further specify the nature of the causal relation-
ship between signs and dispositions. For this, I go back to Searle again. How can we under-
stand the fusion between function and meaning at this stage of the causal circuitry? 
In Searle’s theory of institutions the so-called ‘status function’ and the ‘power creation opera-
tor’ play a central role. The status function builds on language in a most general sense. In a 
status function, a certain entity is treated as another entity, hence a metaphorical relation is 
created, depending on a particular context. The status function has the general form: 
<X counts as Y in context C> 
For example, I can treat a piece of metal as ‘money’, which is different from just using that 
piece in a simple barter process in which the traders may have some generalized use for it. A 
status function involves a fundamental conceptual shift to another category of meanings. This 
is a linguistic activity because it cannot be done individually, as the use of the target concept 
depends on rules shared in a population of users of the concept (along Wittgensteinian 1958 
lines of his private language argument, see Candlish 2004).  
Institutions presuppose collective intentionality in the sense that the status function must build 
on a collectively shared understanding. Once this has emerged, the metaphor gains in onto-
logical validity and robustness, as it evolves into an observer-relative fact, the institution. So, 
if in a community of language users a certain metal is used as money, single individuals can-
not change this use just by taking an autonomous decision. Similar to related approaches to 
collective intentionality (e.g. Tuomela 1995), Searle also assumes that these collective uses 
may build on power relations in a certain community, but one has to be aware of the fact that 
these themselves build on institutions. So, current institutions are a complex web of mutually 
supporting  institutions,  which  can  be  traced  back  to  some  original  situation  where  ‘brute Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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facts’ counted more, in the sense, for example, that power relations may have been based on 
violence, or other physical facts, such as walls separating social spheres.  
The distance between modern institutions and their incipient forms can be explained by the 
recursiveness of the status function, and can be compared to the etymological relations in lan-
guage. That is, modern word use almost always goes back to past metaphors, yet this does not 
mean that those metaphors still determine our understanding of the meaning in terms of actual 
usages  (Pinker  2007:  Chapter  5).  In  the  same  way,  a  modern  institution  such  as  money 
evolved  through  a  series  of  recursive  status  functions,  ending  up  with  different  forms  of 
money, for example, such as cash, giral accounts etc. Yet, it is a question of empirical inquiry 
whether  primordial  status  functions  still  hold,  which  may  directly  relate  institutions  with 
‘brute facts’ such as elementary biological functionings (as in the case of many religious 
symbols and institutions, see Burkert 1996). I argue that such ‘brute facts’ in the historical 
emergence can be still present in the emotional mechanisms underpinning an institution, as 
we shall see with money. 
The status function is a metaphor in the most general sense: There is a transfer of meaning 
across previously disconnected domains, which is the very foundation of institutional creativi-
ty. Human individuals collectively create a new concept, money, for which a piece of metal, 
the coin, serves as a metaphor. I will now argue that Searle’s status function can be interpre-
ted in terms of a causal conjunction between signs and neuronal states, thus completing the 
naturalistic revision of the Aoki model. Lakoff (2008) has developed a neuronal theory of 
metaphor which can help us to clarify the linkage between the notion of the status function, 
which is a purely cognitive notion, and the notion of a neurophysiologically rooted behavioral 
disposition. So, in the framework depicted in figure 1, we move up to higher levels of genera-
lity, with Lakoff’s theory serving as a specification of the more general paradigm of Neuronal 
Darwinism. 
This theory posits a number of structural and processual characteristics of the brain, which are 
supposed to correspond to the conceptual operations that underly the creation and use of me-
taphors (Gentner and Bowdle 2008). As it is also assumed in generalized connectionist and 
network models of cognition (for a seminal approach, see Strauss and Quinn 1997), concepts 
are seen as corresponding to arrangements of neuronal groups which are overlapping and or-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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ganized into higher-level circuits with different fundamental patterns of connectivity (for a 
survey of related empirical brain research, see Coulson 2008). The basic mechanism behind 
this pattern formation is the dualism of activation and inhibition across neurons that form part 
of a group. Recurrent activation and inhibition linkages through neuronal firing result in neu-
ronal bindings of different degrees of rigidity, which is basically the synchronization of neu-
ronal firings across populations of neurons. In particular, moving balances between inhibition 
and activation can catalyze the activation of circuits across different domains in the brain. 
Different distinctive larger patterns can emerge, such as dominant groupings that are activated 
by a single cue (for example, the fear of snakes activated by the view of a snake), or so-called 
Gestalt circuits, in which the perception of parts of a phenomenon is completed by internal 
constructive processes in the brain. A central mechanism is the mapping between neuronal 
groups in different parts of the brain, which connect internally activating groups via an addi-
tional Gestalt mechanism, such that the partial activation of one group simultaneously acti-
vates the entire other group in other parts of the brain. For the analysis of the cognitive pro-
cesses that underly status functions in institutional theory, two larger structural features of 
connections in the brain are crucial, mappings and bindings. Maps are projections across dif-
ferent brain areas, bindings establish a unity between more simple constituent units which can 
also relate with independent concepts.  
The dynamics of this system is guided by a small number of principles, of which the best-fit 
principle is very important for the evolution of conceptual structures. The best-fit principle 
means that the brain maximizes connectivity, under the constraint of given inhibitory relations 
between neuronal substructures. This is the force that underlies Gestalt dynamics and the 
creation of meanings from contextual cues. As a result of these different dynamics, the brain 
can build more complex linkages between simple mappings and bindings, which in turn can 
be the object of further mappings and bindings. At the same time, if only for stochastic rea-
sons, those structures can be continuously reshuffled and recreated. 
Lakoff’s approach can be put into the general framework of Neuronal Darwinism that was 
developed by Edelman (1987) for the first time and has been extended into a full scale theory 
of mind and cognitive processing (Edelman 2006), presaged in Campbell’s (1960) seminal 
thinking, and even Hayek’s (1952) early work (for other related seminal approaches, see Cal-
vin 1996, 1998; Hull et al. 2001). The structure of Edelman’s theory is as follows (Edelman Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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and Tonioni 1995 offer a good summary, see also the assessment by Sacks 1995). The basic 
idea is that the brain operates as a group selectionist system, in which groups of neurons com-
pete against each other in mobilizing resources (e.g. neurotrophines) for neuronal growth and 
activity.  
The evolution of the neuronal system starts with developmental selection before birth, which 
features a highly disordered growth of neuronal connections under genetic constraints. Pre-
sumably, neuronal capacities for primary emotions emerge, which have phylogenetic roots 
and shape further brain development in terms of a set of basic evaluative mechanisms, related 
to survival and reproduction (e.g. primary emotions such as rage or lust, see Toronchuk and 
Ellis 2005). In Lakoff’s theory, and corresponding to Searle’s framework, these basic structu-
res build the basis for the transformation of primary bodily, i.e. sensorimotoric experience 
into more abstract conceptual schemes, especially linguistic representations (Gallese and La-
koff 2005; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; for a critical review, see Pinker 2007). 
After birth, experiential selection takes place through which connections between neurons are 
strengthened according to differential sensory and motor inputs. Selection is guided by the set 
of genetically transmitted value systems, which define the fitness of neuronal units as reflec-
ting certain causal mappings between events and states of the world and their effects on survi-
val and reproduction, and which operate via the release of a number of neurotransmitters and 
other chemical substances in the brain, such as endorphines which relate with affects of plea-
sure (a value, for example, can be, ‘eating is better than non-eating’). Building on these ele-
mentary structures, a further increase of complexity is achieved by means of re-entrant signal-
ling and re-entrant mapping, which corresponds to Lakoff’s similar notions of mappings and 
bindings. This refers to the increasing density of signal relations between neuronal groups 
which map different aspects of reality. Re-entrant signalling is different from feedback me-
chanisms in neuronal network models of error correction, as it primarily results in the active 
construction of the world by the brain. Via re-entrant signalling, neuronal groups end up in 
stable arrangements.  
Now, in order to complete the general framework for analyzing the neuroscience foundation 
for the phenomenon of the institutionalization of behavior, what is missing is the role of 
communication across brains (compare Oullier, Kirman and Kelso 2008; Oullier and Kelso Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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2009). This question is directly relevant for relating the analysis so far with the role of signs 
in the causal circuitry of institutions. Edelman (1987: 320ff.) had already stated that without 
signal exchange across neuronal systems, no internal stabilization would be possible. This 
amounts to a fundamentally externalist position in the theory of mind, which sees mental facts 
as causal conjunctions of neuronal states and external causal processes (on externalism in ge-
neral, see Schantz 2004; on causal theories of mind see Neander 2009, Adams and Aizawa 
2010). One conceptual approach to grasp this role of external factors is the theory of memes 
that has been presented by Aunger (2002). In a nutshell, we can equate recurrent neuronal 
structures with neuromemes in Aunger’s sense, and which relate with external artefacts or 
signs, thus directly connecting with the causal circuitry analyzed by Aoki. In other words, I 
claim that institutions are memes. 
Originally, the theory of memes has been proposed by Dawkins (1989) as an approach to bio-
logy-culture coevolution. Dawkins himself had suggested to look at culture as a meme pool, 
that is, a set of cultural items such as tunes, ideas, or dress styles. Those items were seen as 
replicators similar to genes, which, however, operate in another kind of environment, i.e. hu-
man brains (on the notion of replicator and its generalizations, see Hull and Wilkins 2005). 
For meme reproduction, imitation is the central process (Blackmore 2000). This theory has 
met with devasting criticism, because the direct analogy between genes and memes does not 
hold (e.g. Richerson and Boyd 2005: 80ff., Cordes 2006), although the central role of imitati-
on in the diffusion of cultural items has been further accentuated in recent research (e.g. Bent-
ley and Shennan 2003).  
The Aunger proposal is to substitute the notion of the meme by the notion of the ‘neurome-
me’. The neuromeme is a replicative neuronal structure within the human brain, which is de-
fined according to certain structural effects in the ongoing evolution of the neuronal architec-
ture, both in the static and the dynamic sense. This proposal fits into Neuronal Darwinism 
framework. The specific mechanisms are still theoretical, but make empirical sense (see e.g. 
Fernando et al. 2008). 
By definition, neuromemes do not reside outside the individual brain, so that there is no way 
to presume that neuromemes are the same across different brains. This differs fundamentally 
from the Dawkins conception: The neuromeme is a unit of neuronal evolution, but not of cul-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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tural evolution. They do not have meanings in the sense of culture, but are defined according 
to neuronal functionings. At the same time, neuronal evolution is a process that is basically 
independent from genetic evolution. That is, neuromemetics, following theories of neuronal 
selection and Neuronal Darwinism, posits that gene-culture coevolution is based on the simul-
taneous and interlocking runs of myriads of autonomous neuronal evolutionary sequences, 
with the neuromeme as the replicator. However, the extension to the notion of culture requires 
the introduction of another conceptual category. This is communication across brains, and, 
more specifically, artefacts (Aunger 2002: 276ff.). 
Cultural meaning supervenes on communication across brains, which operates via artefacts, in 
Aunger’s parlance, or signs, as stated previously. The notion of a sign includes a broad range 
of physical phenomena, not only artefacts in the usual sense, but also, and foremostly, embo-
died signals such as the soundwaves of language or body movements. Signs are an essential 
part  of  a  closed  causal  circuit  which  underlies  the  process  of  imitation  in  populations  of 
brains. In recent theories about concept formation, the basic sensorimotoric feedback loop 
between motor outputs and the resulting sensory inputs, continuously matched with phyloge-
netically  rooted  valuation  mechanisms,  is  the  elementary  unit  from  which  more  complex 
structures emerge (Hurley 2008; Fogassi 2011). On the one hand, via output inhibition this 
builds the basis for the internalization of functionings. On the other hand, outputs can simul-
taneously be inputs into different brains, thus enabling double track feedback loops between 
Egos and Alters Outputs. Thus, a neuromeme causes a behavioral output, the sign, which in 
turn triggers a neuromeme in another brain. This might elicit another output which feeds back 
into the originating brain. The convergence of outputs in terms of functionings results into a 
cross-brain  coordination  of  neuromemes,  without  implying  that  the  neuromemes  have  the 
similar structure across brains. In this framework, we can argue that signs emerge out of such 
feedback circuits, ending up in a convergence of signs. In other words, in Aunger’s frame-
work  cultural  evolution  is  a  causally  coupled  coevolution  of  populations  of  neuromemes 
within individual brains and populations of signs, i.e. brain outputs (an abstract view on this is 
provided in fig. 3, for more detail see Herrmann-Pillath 2010/11). 
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Figure 3: Coordination between brains via signs 
 
This viewpoint vindicates the more general externalist approach to mind, especially in the 
shape of theories on distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Sterelny 
2004; Clark 2011). The brain necessarily relies on a large and open range of external objects 
to achieve a stable equilibrium in what would be a chaotic fluctuation of neuronal firings oth-
erwise. Contrary to Dawkins, culture cannot be equated with memes. But culture appears to 
be a set of signs which provide the stability and continuity so that the epistemic functionings 
of the brain can be scaffolded and leveraged. Culture, however, does not have a mentalist di-
mension here, though being causally interrelated with brain processes. If we were to continue 
with the use of the term ‘meme’, because it is a commonplace in many attempts at extending 
Darwinian analysis into other areas, we can redefine a meme as a stable conjunction of arte-
facts and neuromemes that evolve independent from each other, though being causally con-
nected closely.  
I can now close the circle of my argument. I posit firstly, that institutions can be equated with 
memes in the sense of stable conjunctions of signs and neuromemes. Further, the emerging 
neuronal patterns provide the foundation for behavioral dispositions that can be activated by 
external cues, the signs, and which are amplified via endogenous Darwinian mechanisms of Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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neuronal selection and pattern emergence. These internal mechanisms provide the foundation 
for metaphors, which is the basis for Searle’s status function. Hence, the neuroscience frame-
work can help to grasp three facts. One is that the neuronal system is creative, the second is 
that it involves external facts and hence is anchored in an objective ontology, and third, the 
bridge between internal and external processes is built via concepts that have neurophysiolo-
gical correlates.  
It is important to notice that the causal linkages shown in figure 3 also allow for a clear con-
ception of performativity that we have introduced in the context of the Aoki model. Performa-
tivity is based on feedback loops between motoric outputs and sensory inputs, and it becomes 
externally anchored via the diffusion of the sign correlates in a population of individuals that 
communicate via the exchange of artefacts. That is, performativity follows from the external-
ist approach to the mind/brain, combined with collective intentionality that emerges from neu-
romemetic evolution. The only remaining clarification is to present appropriate tools to ana-
lyze the conceptual correlates of the neuronal processes, following Lakoff’s line of reasoning. 
According to the framework of figure 1, I propose to relate Searle’s theory to Fauconnier and 
Turner’s (2002; 2008) theory of conceptual blends, put into the context of Neuronal Darwin-
ism. A conceptual blend is precisely this: Two concepts in different conceptual spaces are 
blended within a certain generic space, so that a new concept emerges, which may show also 
a new blend of pre-existing properties. A blend is simply a higher-order neuronal mapping 
that builds on more elementary maps in the neuronal system, and crosses different parts of the 
brain (compare Coulson 2008). Because of the highly fluid nature of neuronal group selection, 
one can explain why the brain constantly creates novelty in the sense of new mappings be-
tween partial aspects of concepts that organize sensory and motor inputs. In a selectionist sys-
tem, there can be no fixed reference, and only fuzzy meanings pop up from the dynamic 
course of neuronal variation, selection and retention (Edelman 2006: 98ff.). Thus, conceptual 
evolution might be imagined to proceed from some most basic concepts to the more complex 
ones, even though this is only a merely analytical convenience, because for a certain set of 
concepts at a particular point of time, all concepts relate synchronically, independent from 
their presumed diachronic order of emergence. Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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There are different kinds of blends, with different degrees of structural complexity. All blends 
can be described as conceptual networks with directed relations. For example, a simplex net-
work is just a projection of an abstract reference frame on a particular input space. The most 
interesting case is the double-scope network, which is also most relevant for our analysis of 
the status function. In a double-scope network, two input spaces are projected into a generic 
space, such that the blend does not retain all properties of the input spaces, that is, it emerges 
as a novelty not only as a concept, but also regarding the specific combination of manifest 
properties. Clearly, this allows for the construction of new blends if that first blend is then 
projected into other generic spaces with other inputs and so forth. 
* * * 
We have now put together all necessary elements for a naturalistic theory of institutions. This 
can be finally summarized in terms of the replicator-interactor duality. The central observa-
tion is that in the phenomenon of institutions, evolutionary processes on different levels inter-
act, i.e the population level and the neuronal level. This interaction can be conceived along 
the lines of the naturalized Aoki model, which I have extended to include Searle’s theory of 
institutions. On the population level, we locate the interactor, which is the recurrent equilibria 
in states of interactions between individuals. These states include the generation of signs, 
which connect causally with neuronal structures in the individuals. Those structures are the 
physical embodiments of Searle’s status functions, which we can analyze on different levels, 
in turn, especially the conceptual level, which is accessible via cognitive sciences, linguistics 
and related disciplines. The neuronal dynamics creates behavioral dispositions to display cer-
tain actions that interact on the population level. The neuronally mediated causal link between 
signs and dispositions is the replicator.  
Clearly, in the context of general Darwinism, this model is a co-evolutionary model in which 
the environment (in this case, the signs) and somatic storages of information co-evolve (such 
as Odling-Smee et al. 2003 or Jablonka and Lamb 2006). This is necessarily complex. In the 
next section, in order to prepare the ground for the empirical application on the institution of 
money, I start with a proposal for simplification. Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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3  Darwinizing money 
3.1  The pivotal role of emotions in the naturalistic approach to institutions 
In order to render the naturalistic theory of institutions empirically traceable, I propose to in-
troduce the analytical category of ‘emotions’. There are many competing theories about the 
brain and its structure, and I dare to be selective in an almost opportunistic fashion. In the 
structure outlined in figure 3, valuations play an important role, as they connect the neuronal 
dynamics with stored information about past adaptive functionings. Damasio has proposed the 
theory of ‘somatic markers’ to account for this function (Damasio 1995, Bechara and Dama-
sio 2005). This theory also advances the idea that those evaluative functions flow together in 
the phenomenon of ‘emotions’.  
In recent approaches to human behavior and the brain, emotions are seen as higher level coor-
dinating neuronal mechanisms that relate with fundamental valuations, which result from evo-
lutionary processes on different levels, in turn. This leads to a simple restatement of the theory 
of institutions. In many models of current economic theorizing, an institution is seen as a cor-
relate between a set of external incentives and enforcement mechanisms on the one hand and 
a set of cognitive models on the other, such that institution-guided behavior is always frame-
dependent (North 2005). Those frames are shared in a population of rule-followers. However, 
in these cognitive theories in economics emotions are not taken into consideration. This is 
remarkable, as we can say that after the cognitive turn of the 1960s we observe another turn 
towards emotions since the 1990s in the human sciences. Economics has been a late-comer as 
far as cognition is concerned, and this translates into an even slower response to the emotional 
turn (for rare early attempts, see Frank 1988; Elster 1998). Currently, hotspots of research into 
emotions are the literature in experimental economics which deals with commitment devices, 
among others (see Hopfensitz / Reuben 2009 and the literature referenced therein), and, of 
course, the revival of the ‘animal spirits’ notion after the financial crisis of 2008 (see e.g. 
Tuckett 2009 with a psychoanalytical background). 
This is not the place where I can discuss the immensely complex literature on cognition and 
emotion (with special reference to the notion of rationality, see Pham 2004, 2007). So I just 
posit one particular position. This is to define emotions as framed affects, such that the notion Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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of the frame, well recognized in economics now (Gintis 2006), can serve as the conceptual 
bridge between the notions of emotions and institutions, as we say that frames are just another 
expression of the more general notion of the status function.  In evolutionary psychology, 
emotions are seen as higher-order neuronal structures that coordinate sets of more elementary 
affectual circuits (Tooby and Cosmides 2005: 52ff.). As such, they are necessarily related 
with cognitive structures, in the sense that the coordination builds on pattern recognition in 
the environment. Thus, the emotional complex underlying fear of snakes is related with cogni-
tive mechanisms of identifying snakes, including all possible transfers of meaning by meta-
phorical uses of the term etc. 
This argument can be also inverted, in the sense that cognition presupposes affectual mecha-
nisms which provide the ultimate standards of evaluation, which is, for instance, essential to 
select informational cues from the environment (Pham 2007: 161ff.). This is the claim put 
forward  by  Damasio’s  theory  of  somatic  markers.  From  this  follows,  that  cognitive  ap-
proaches in institutional economics cannot work without taking emotions as a central cate-
gory. However, so far economics is missing a conceptual framework for doing this, as even in 
the majority of heterodox approaches a variation on the theme of rationality is maintained, 
mostly in the shape of bounded rationality, and emotions are rarely systematically explored 
(Phelps 2008).  
I argue that the concept of ‘emotion’ is the missing conceptual link between the general evo-
lutionary framework developed in the previous section and the analysis of specific institutions 
such as money, which I present in this section. That is, I posit that the fundamental replicator 
in an institution such as money is a causal conjunction of a sign and an emotion, the latter 
understood as a higher-level neuromeme in the sense of Aunger’s. This approach offers a re-
sponse to Glimcher’s (2011: 423f.) challenge. Glimcher ponders that money should be one of 
the priority research topics in neuroeconomics, because of its centrality in the incentive sys-
tems in recently evolved human economic systems. He speculates that there must be a specific 
neuronal structure that undergirds the human handling of money. I submit a proposal how that 
structure might look like. However, I do not posit a specific structure, but a mechanism that 
builds on the generic structures of the human brain. This is because I follow an externalist 
appropach, which implies that the specificity of the institution of money does not lie in the 
specificity of internal structures of the brain, but in the specificity of the money artefacts, Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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hence the causal circuitry between the money signs and the emotions qua neuronal structures. 
So, my discussion of tbe institution of money serves two purposes. One is to present an appli-
cation of the theory, but second is to further develop the theory in terms of advancing the no-
tion of emotion as an empirically traceable expression of neuronal dynamics. Therefore, I 
begin with analyzing the emotions that go along with the societal use of money. 
3.2  Money emotions 
The best place to begin an exploration of money emotions is where the pinnacle of the eco-
nomic notion of rationality seems to have been materialized, i.e. the modern financial mar-
kets, which have been the object of the conceptual struggle between rational theory of finance 
and behavioral finance in recent decades.  
Looking at the activities involving the ‘money professions’, recent anthropological and socio-
logical research has shown that financial trading is a far cry from being a purely rational-
calculative concern (Zaloom 2003; 2004). Trading financial assets involves very strong feel-
ings and requires a special emotional discipline, which, however, does not simply mean to 
supress emotions, which are absolutely necessary to raise the alertness and aggressiveness 
indispensible to sucessful trading. Making money often shows a resemblance to making sex, 
highly exciting, but also highly dangerous, in the sense of financial ruin or social and physical 
havoc (sexual diseases, unwanted pregnancy etc.) (Seabright 2004: 76). This is reflected in 
the language and the habits of traders’ communities (Hassoun 2005). After all, the financial 
business is also highly gender-biased with a very pronounced male dominance (Klaes et al. 
2007). Recently, those affectual underpinnings have been related to different testosterone lev-
els in both male and female traders affecting their relative professional success and other as-
pects of the neuronal and hormone system (Maestripieri et al. 2009; Wargo et al. 2010). 
Thus, rationality in financial trading does not appear to be a given capability of the univer-
sally rational individual, but results from special emotional disciplines and techniques of self-
management that both contain and exploit underlying affectual drives (Preda 2008: 918). This 
can be also seen in the larger context of historical sociology, which reveals how the investor 
as a particular kind of  personality emerged in  the 19th century (Preda 2005).  In an even 
broader perspective, the emergence of modern capitalism was accompanied by strong reac-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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tions in religion and folk beliefs, often resulting in a demonization of money. Against this 
background, Max Weber’s account of the rise of capitalism acquires a new meaning, as he 
had argued that Calvinism inspired its believers with a particular emotional stance towards 
money. As an expression of ‘innerworldly ascetism,’ Calvinists were able to pair the acquisi-
tive drive with abstention from lavishly spending it, thus launching the machine of accumula-
tion in early capitalism. 
These sketchy observations clearly underline what is evident from our everyday experience: 
Money causes strong emotions, and using and spending money has an emotional basis. Yet, in 
economics emotions normally do not play a role in theoretical explanations. In the case of 
money, theory is even more antiseptic, as money is mainly a ‘veil’, that is, a device purely 
used to ease transactions, without any independent utility. How can a veil cause such strong 
emotions? Something important is missing in the economics of money.  
Contrary to the economic theory of money, one of the important results of neuroeconomics is 
that money comes close to being a direct reinforcer. That means, money activates the same 
dopaminergic circuits in the human brain (more exactly, the mesolimbic system) as other 
items causing pleasure, such as beautiful faces (Camerer et al. 2005: 35, Phelps 2009: 240). 
This simple fact is exploited in the work of psychologists, as money can be directly used as a 
generalized reward without further modification (Knutson  and Wimmer 2007: 159f.). From 
that perspective, money is nothing special, as it just triggers general reward mechanisms in 
the  human  brain,  possibly  even  involving  a  so-called  ‘common  currency’  (Landreth  and 
Bickle 2008). There is no interference by an alleged purely instrumental role of money, which 
would imply that money would mean different rewards to people who might have different 
uses of money in mind when receiving the reward.  
An interesting case in point is the asymmetry in loss aversion in experiments with gift certifi-
cates (Trepel et al. 2005: 41). If people are offered certificates for goods with different he-
donic value, they choose them with equiprobability, but if they asked to part with particular 
certificates, they respond exceptionally strong for those representing goods with higher he-
donic value, thus manifesting a differential effect of loss aversion as compared to gains per-
ception. Vice versa, such kind of asymmetry is also reflected in the tendency of people to 
avoid the pains caused by paying cash, such that they love to enter flat-rate payment arrange-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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ments in many areas or bonus schemes, which clearly simply hide what can be in effect a 
higher factual expense (Camerer et al. 2005: 36). This observation invalidates criticisms such 
as Harrison’s (2008: 306f.) who argues that it is a common economic assumption in econom-
ics that the utility of money is equivalent to the basket of goods that can be purchased with 
money, as this would require strong cognitive capabilities of individuals and convergence 
across different individuals. In game theoretic contexts, if money is taken as an equivalent to 
pay-offs in terms of utility, this is just a simplifying methodological assumption. The sepa-
rateness of money in reward mechanisms is further proven by many other empirical results in 
behavioral finance and economics. 
Before recounting these, one has to be careful with distinguishing between the two reward 
processing systems in the brain. If money activates the same dopaminergic circuits as other 
positively valued things, this refers to the so-called ‘wanting’ system, so there is a difference 
to the ‘liking’ system which refers to the actual consummation (Trepel et al. 2005; Camerer 
2006; Brocas and Carrillo 2008; Berridge 2009). This distinction confirms the distinction be-
tween ‘experience utility’ and ‘decision utility’ that has been proposed in the psychological 
literature on economic choice (Kahnemann et al. 1997). The wanting system underlies the 
processes that guide anticipatory planning and expectations. Clearly, we cannot eat money, so 
the actual consummation cannot cause the same effects as with other goods, but that is also 
true for every differerent commodity. If neuroeconomists relate the wanting system with a 
generalized notion of utility, the results concerning money could be simply translated into the 
proposition that money carries utility, as it triggers the generic dopaminergic mechanisms. 
Yet, this is not the ordinary assumption in economics, which treats money as being different 
from all other goods. 
The autonomous role of money as a reinforcer is related with important anomalies in behav-
ioral economics and finance. For example, people loath the loss of cash dividends and do not 
net them out with capital gains, so cash seems to carry an additional value (see surveys of 
behavioral finance such as Van der Saar 2004 or Subrahmanyam 2007). This can be explained 
by complex conceptual constructions, such as an interaction between loss aversion and hyper-
bolic discount curves. A present cash loss is weighted relatively strong against a future capital 
gain, even though the two might be equivalent for a rational decision maker. People organize 
their perceptions in different mental accounts for income and wealth, such that current income Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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shows a disproportionally strong impact on consumption behavior, as compared to the predic-
tions of rational choice theory (surveyed in Akerlof 2007). Thus, people seem to need a spe-
cial approach to manage money in the narrow sense, that is, cash, which is deeply grounded in 
social norms and expectations. Lack of control in spending money is often seen as a lack of 
self-control. The special meaning of cash in those systems of behavioral regulation can be 
also gleaned from the fact that credit cards seem to loosen those constraints, presumably be-
cause they have different effects in the context of hyperbolic discount curves, combined with 
loss aversion (Laibson 1997). 
These observations are also related to the equity premium puzzle, which has been explained 
by moving reference points with regard to dividend payments, as opposed to capital gains. If 
reference points move, different degrees of loss aversion are implied, thus explaining the ad-
ditional risk premium necessary to make the trades equal. If this explanation is valid, how-
ever, this implies that money activates the neuronal mechanisms underlying frame-dependent 
loss aversion (Knutson et al. 2008), whereas the more complex accounting constructs of capi-
tal gains and losses do not. The same monetary values trigger different neuronal responses, 
depending on their representation. 
The clearest proof, also confirmed by brain research recently, for the independent reward trig-
gered by money is money illusion. The existence of money illusion has been confirmed by 
psychological research beyond any doubt (Shafir et al. 1997). For example, people normally 
report higher satisfaction with deals involving higher nominal quantities of money to deals 
with lower ones, even if, in an inflationary setting, the real values are the same. In brain imag-
ing studies, researchers could show that the reward circuits in the brain react much stronger 
with the higher nominal, yet identical real values, and they could even identify proportional 
activities in the pertinent brain areas (Weber et al. 2009). 
To summarize, recent research in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics has shown that 
money can be seen as a direct reinforcer in the same way as other goods. Obtaining and keep-
ing money satisfies a want that is independent from the derived need for money to obtain 
other goods. This implies, that our standard conception of money may be misled by the as-
sumption that money is a general purpose exchange medium. Although this use of money is 
part and parcel of the modern institution of money, it may not be at the core of the social fact. Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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In other words, the transactional use of money might be a derived function, which is, how-
ever, prevalent in modern economies. So-called behavioral anomalies of money use can be 
explained by the fact that these two functions of money interact in social practice. However, 
so far we have only stated that money is ‘normal’ in the sense of triggering standard reward 
processing mechanisms in the brain. This does not suffice to explain the many other emo-
tional intricacies related with the use of money, and does not eventually meet Glimcher’s 
question what makes money special. 
3.3  Money, signal selection and the human instinct to social exchange 
The analysis of money emotions presented so far does not yet identify a specific emotion that 
is triggered by the use of money. Psychologists Lea and Webley (2006) have recently propo-
sed a ‘drug and tool’ theory of money, which presents a proposal of identification. The upshot 
of their argument builds on a large number of empirical observations of the kind that I have 
sketched in the previous section, that is, in their wording, money is a strong and universal 
incentive. Clearly, money is used as a tool in many contexts, that is, as a mere transaction 
device, but at the same time it manifests very strong emotional reactions in other contexts, and 
can trigger strong drives of acquisitive and hoarding behavior. To grasp this phenomenon 
conceptually, the authors introduce the notion of a ‘perceptual drug’ which differs from a me-
re psychoactive drug such as nicotine. Perceptual drugs hijack an existing instinct or behavio-
ral drive without actually satisfying the underlying adaptive biological functions. Thus, an 
instinct of sex may be triggered by certain erotic signals, yet without actually satisfying the 
underlying drive to reproduce. As a consequence, the trigger can result into a drug, even rein-
forcing the underlying behavior, but without any biological value, and without the final con-
summation of the underlying drive. 
This specific argument about the addictive roles of money is problematic, as it does not match 
with established theories about addiction, which do not make the distinction between psycho-
active and perceptual drugs (e.g. the authoritive overview of West 2006). In some theories, 
the psychoactive drugs are only a special case of the more general model of addiction which 
emphasizes internal malfunctionings of brain mechanisms, especially related with learning 
(e.g. Redish et al. 2008). One approach would emphasize the fundamental duality of wanting 
and liking in the human neuronal system and resulting psychological setup, that I referred to Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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already in the previous section: There is a duality of rewards operating in the activities of 
planning and acting to acquire a certain benefit, and the rewards actually resulting from con-
suming the pertinent acts. In the neuroeconomic literature, this intermediation is reflected in 
the autonomous role of the dopamine circuits in guiding action as distinguished from con-
summation of actions, which implies that the dopaminergic circuits themselves are involved 
in creating the phenomenon of addiction. This simple connection emerges from the fact that 
dopamine signals code deviations between actions and results, such that positive results trig-
ger further action (reward prediction errors, see Schultz 2009). Thus, the dopamine circuits 
can establish self-reinforcing feedback loops. Addiction would result from failures of the as-
sociated learning process, such that the wanting system runs astray and drives behavior auto-
nomously. In the context of money, the most appropriate illustration is gambling (Ross et al. 
2008, Clark 2010). In gambling, the individual seeks the rewards of money, but succumbs to 
the mechanism which increases dopamine levels in her brain because of the ongoing percepti-
on of failures which are close to the target (hence indicate improvements, in the sense of posi-
tive reward prediction errors), and which are even interpreted as indicators of the individual 
skills of the gambler (illusion of control). Thus, I retain the Lea and Webley approach to mo-
ney, but put forward a slightly different theoretical explanation. Whereas Lea and Webley 
start out from a general theory about perceptual drugs, I would follow mainstream addiction 
theory and claim that there are few cases that correspond to that notion, because in most appa-
rent examples the neuronal mechanisms that undergird the addiction are by no means obvious. 
But I think that Lea and Webley are right in emphasizing the empirical evidence in the case of 
money, which, however, would only demonstrate that money can have drug-like effects, de-
pending on the context of actions (such as gambling), precisely because it relates with certain 
neurophysiologically encoded valuations that link up with the standard mechanisms causing 
addictive behaviors. 
Now, we can interpret this view in terms of a general Darwinian approach. The phenomenon 
of malfunctioning that is apparent in addictive behavior can be related to the Darwinian theo-
ry of signal selection as stated by Zahavi and Zahavi (1997). The dualism of wanting and li-
king underlies the human capacity to plan and has phylogenetic roots in the evolution of the 
mammalian brain (overview in McCabe 2008: 354ff.). This, in turn, functionally requires re-
presentation, that is, builds on language, and more general on symbols that intervene in the Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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causal process of eliciting goal-oriented behavior (for more on that in a general evolutionary 
argument, see Dennett 1991 or Millikan 1989, 2005). Therefore, different from purely instinc-
tual or reflexive reactions, human behavior is systematically built on the distinction between 
the sign and the object. Thus, an apple is both on object and its sign. The signs play the cruci-
al role in anticipatory reward mechanisms that underly the wanting system. With this insight, 
we can establish a direct conceptual linkage with our previous analysis of the role of signs in 
institutions. 
Now, the theory of signal selection implies that for arbitrary signs, the so-called handicap 
principle may apply, depending on the selective context. The handicap principle posits that 
the coordination of behavior via signals may require the investment into costly signals which 
produces an adaptive disadvantage in the sense of natural selection (as opposed e.g. to sexual 
selection) (Dawkins 1989: 309ff.; Grafen 1990). Yet, precisely these costs make the signal 
functional, because otherwise it would be open to manipulation and cheating. That is, handi-
caps are truthful signals and because of that, are adaptive in terms of the universal currency of 
reproductive success. Yet, this implies the possibility of outright runaway processes which 
appear to be maladaptive, if only the pure engineeering standards are applied, such as in the 
case of big antlers of deer that might hamper agility of movements. 
In extension of the Lea and Webley approach, I posit that the handicap principle underlies 
also the malfunctioning of the human decision system, elaborating on a suggestion of Ascoli 
and McCabe (2005) in their comment on the Lea and Webley paper. Ascoli and McCabe pon-
der whether the argument may hold for all scarce goods. An excellent example is eating (Ber-
ridge 2009). In times of scarcity of food, certainly prevalent throughout most of human phy-
logenetic past, the signs of food become exceptionally important for behavioral choices. This 
implies that the signs will also play a crucial role in behavioral coordination. Accordingly, 
food use is also governed by signal selection, ending up in the many examples of ritualized 
and very expensive and elaborate food customs. If that is the case, however, the sign of food 
can also trigger malfunctionings. As such, it underlies the many dysfunctions of eating. Peo-
ple who devour sweets without limits do not actually consume the sweets, but the signs of 
sweets, in this interpretation. Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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So, a generalization of the Lea and Webley argument works via the adoption of the broader 
evolutionary framework of signal selection. As in the example of food, the question is which 
fundamental human drive and need might underlie the use of money. I propose a slight, yet 
essential modification of their central idea: which is, that the money drug piggybacks on an 
instinct to trade that evolved out of the universal mechanism of reciprocal altruism. More ge-
nerally, we can point to the emotional patterns underlying social exchange that have been 
identified by evolutionary psychology (Cosmides and Tooby 2005, Ermer et al. 2006). Evolu-
tionary psychology argues that the human species manifests a peculiar emotional structure 
that enables humans to maintain complex networks of social exchange based on reciprocity. 
Though reciprocity as such is a universal biological phenomenon (Trivers 1985: Chapter 3; 
Noë et al. 2001), the human species excels in terms of the generalization and the scope of ex-
change patterns (Seabright 2004). In these relations, both competitive and cooperative relati-
ons occur, often simultaneously, as modelled in game theoretic approaches towards egoistic 
cooperation (for example, in hunting large game, epitomized in Rousseau’s stag hunt, see 
Skyrms 2004). As a result, modern evolutionary approaches to the development of the human 
brain posit the ‘social brain’ hypothesis (e.g. Dunbar and Shultz 2007; Frith 2007). Following 
up to earlier versions of Macchiavellian intelligence (Byrne 1995), this hypothesis states that 
the evolutionary more recent and innovative neuronal structures in the human brain are geared 
towards the organization and manipulation of social exchange. This evolutionary argument 
can be further supported by the observation that phylogenetically  closer animals can also 
show distinctly human deviations from rational choice models, if they also live in highly inte-
ractive social groups (Santos and Chen 2009). 
From that perspective, money is a sign that triggers emotional responses related to social ex-
change in general. These are affects that relate with calculating mutual benefits across time, 
with detecting cheaters, or with perceiving mutual relations of indebtedness. Money as a drug 
mobilizes these emotional patterns, without actually satisfying them, which can only be done 
with executing the underlying exchanges (i.e. the ‘liking’ system). Yet, money triggers the 
same reward mechanisms (the ‘wanting’ system), which, accidentally, also seem to be activa-
ted in the entirely different setting of PD dilemmata (Knutson and Wimmer 2007: 166; Fehr 
2009). This seems to go back to the fact that the perception of cues to cooperation is tanta-
mount to the perception of gains, i.e. rewards. Indeed, PD dilemmata also manifest social ex-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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change relations, as it is evident from considering repeated games, which is the reasonable 
assumption for primordial human groups and trading communities. Therefore, the historical 
record that indicates the primary role of hierarchically embedded reciprocity in the emergence 
of money seems to match with the observation that evolutionary more ancient patterns of so-
cial exchange might not have been related with market-kind behavior, but with exchange of 
contrived goods (Ofek 2001: Chapter 9). The complexity of exchange in these cases results 
precisely from the intermingling of exchange relations with cooperative behavior, as in main-
taining and sharing fire, or in hunting and sharing large game. 
So, finally I have identified the emotion that directly relates causally with money as a sign. 
Therefore we can posit that this causal conjunction between money signs and money emotions 
is the replicator underlying the sustainable existence of the institution of money in human 
societies. Then, the question pops up whether we can relate these insights to the historical 
analysis of the emergence of money. Clearly, early money was a phenomenon related with 
social exchange. Against the background of my evolutionary model of institutions, could we 
be able to do some work in cognitive archeology, in order to show how the emotional under-
pinnings of the institution of money relate with the cognitive mechanisms that resulted with 
the diffusion of the artefact of money? 
3.4  The emergence of money as the creation of a new metaphor 
I will now use the notion of the conceptual blend to reconstruct the emergence of money. 
Subsequently, I use money as a most generic term, that is, I do not differentiate between diffe-
rent kinds of money. However, I draw a relatively neat line between the mere fact of a parti-
cular good to be used as medium of exchange (pure commodity money) and money as an in-
stitution, which I relate to the emergence of the first coins. This transition is the central con-
cern of this section. So, if I use the term ‘money’ subsequently, it is always in the second 
sense. 
In this context it is important to notice that there is a clear contradiction between established 
theories  of  the  emergence  of  money  and  the  historical  facts.  Purely  theoretical  accounts 
emphasize the role of money in enabling transactions, as in the triangular exchange paradigm. 
The classic, almost unsurpassed until today, is Menger’s (1892) evolutionary account (for Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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modern receptions, see e.g. Schotter 1982). In these accounts a certain item evolves as (com-
modity) money for the pure function of serving as a transaction device. This also implies that 
basically, there is no conceptual transformation, in the sense of a status function, but only a 
growing functional salience of properties such as resaleability, storability and dividability. In 
Searle’s parlance, the institution of money would emerge as a purely regulatory institution, 
referring to commodity money.  
This view clearly  fits into the established economic theory of money,  but contradicts the 
historical evidence. In fact, money emerged in the context of relations of power and authority, 
regulating hierarchical exchange relations and the production of public goods, and only the 
further evolution was intermingled with the more haphazard use of valuable items in barter 
(for a survey of the evidence, see Chavas and Bromley 2008). The historical data suggest that 
the transactional function of money is in fact a derived function. Hutter (1994) presents an 
intriguing account of the historical facts that we can directly translate into the conceptual 
blend framework and into the status function structure, which precisely models that derivative 
relation between pristine money and derived functions. In Searle’s framework, those status 
functions would come close to a constitutive institution, in which money appears to be a new 
kind of thing, which actually superseded the parallel use of commodities for exchange. 
When money coins emerged for the first time in the Eastern Mediterranean (at least as far as 
Western civilization is concerned), this was an effect of cross-cultural merger of meanings 
between Assyrian culture and the Ionian peasant communities. In Assyria, gold served as an 
indicator of status and as a medium of wealth accumulation in a steeply stratified society. In 
the Greek communities, silver was used for ritual purposes and occasionally for exchange, 
which was mostly mediated via a number of items with less value in barter, thus correspon-
ding to the Menger view. The first genuine coins orginating from Lydia, however, were made 
from electrum, an alloy of silver and gold. Thus, they could be interpreted differently in the 
two societies, enabling cross-cultural exchange of signs and goods. Further, in order to test 
the quality of coins, people applied punchs resulting into punchmark, firstly unintendedly. 
Once the coins circulated, people discovered the possible use of the punchmarks as indicators 
of origin. The question of origin was crucial in lowering quality uncertainty with regard to the 
actual metal composition. From this moment onwards, the custom of coining emerged, with 
the incipient use of the punchmarks as signals. Hutter (1994) speaks of an oscillation between Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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the notions of ‘signed metal’ and ‘metal sign’. Soon, the new coins were reintegrated into the 
political and the religious realm when local regents adopted the institution of minting. Thus, 
the first coins appeared displaying the images of rulers and holy symbols. With this transition, 
we can say that the institution of money has emerged. 
Figure 4: Conceptual blending in the emergence of coins 
Hutter’s account easily can be translated into the framework of conceptual blends. Simultane-
ously, we can apply the status function notion. As we see in a standard Fauconnier and Turner 
notation, the central point is that two different artefacts with different uses in different socie-
ties were merged into a common frame. This corresponds to a so-called ‘double-scope integ-
ration network’, in which two concepts are only partially merged, as in the case of ‘time as 
space’, where the two notions bring in partial meanings into a blend, which, as a specific 
example, was the notion of a ‘day’ which relates to the generic space of circular motion. In a 
similar fashion, in the cross-cultural semantic ambiguity an alloy could be treated both as 
being close to a gold bar or a silver piece, thus also making those two artefacts commensu-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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rable, though only partially. In terms of the status function, in a double-scope integration net-
work we can say that the status function in fact works in both directions, with ‘gold’ being 
treated as ‘silver’ and vice versa, in the context of cross-cultural exchange, and being related 
to the ‘brute fact’ of the physical entity of electrum. In other words, the physical fact of an 
alloy enabled the creation of the status function (compare in general Hutchins 2005). Once the 
status function was established, the institution of money, reified in the emergence of the first 
coins circulating in inter-regional trade, came into existence. The new coins were clearly dif-
ferent from the mere use of commodities in exchange, hence constituting new things as arte-
facts. 
The question is, what is the generic space that corresponds to the ‘brute fact’ of the alloy? 
And how can we relate this cognitive process to emotive structures? In figure 4, I propose to 
use the notion of ‘balanced reciprocity’, which is both an abstract notion underlying ritualized 
power relations and of early exchange across longer time horizons (a classic on this is Pryor 
1977: Chapters 4 and 7; Burkert 1996: Chapter 6). That means, money and balanced recipro-
city are deeply interconnected, which seems to be an acceptable intuition, which, however, 
turns into a hypothesis based on much broader evidence if we connect the status function mo-
del with the analysis of money emotions in the previous sections. Then, we can state that the 
first coins evolved into metaphors for the notion of generalized exchange and reciprocity, 
which connects with the underlying emotions identified by evolutionary psychology. 
So, if money is a sign of that special kind, it is also open to the functioning of signal selection, 
especially with regard to the handicap principle. So it is straightforward to explain why the 
emergence of money immediately went along with the appearance of extreme forms of accu-
mulation and wealth display, as in Greek tyranny. In the original conceptual blend, money 
used for transactions and money used for storing and accumulating wealth were merged into 
one blend. This allows for a handicap mechanism to emerge, in the sense that the capability to 
hoard and display wealth is a marker of the capacity to spend limitless. The waste of wealth in 
useless displays is precisely the signal that communicates the capacity to enter a limitless 
number of transactions, thus claiming the role of a hub with exceptionally high prestige in 
ever-growing networks of exchange. This account matches the historical data in the sense that 
the purely technical uses of money emerged as a side effect of the primordial uses. Later, the 
runaway evolution of money also supported its rapid diffusion as a tool for transactions. This Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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blend was epitomized in the emergence of the coin as an artefact for trade, but at the same 
time as a symbol for power and authority. 











I can now reconstruct the emergence of money in terms of the Aoki model, which specifies 
the underlying causal circuitry (fig. 5). As in the empirical case of Lydian commerce, resul-
ting from cross-cultural interactions between traders, certain physical entities, the coins as 
money tokens, were increasingly used as money, that is, they were recognized socially as a 
new kind of artefact. This involved the transition from the tokens to the signs, hence led to the 
emergence of money species, i.e. certain classes of coins with similar characteristics. These 
social practices result into the realization of the distributed cognition function of the instituti-
on, i.e. the diffusion of money enables the innovation of new uses of the signs qua artefacts, 
such as in the different dimensions of money functions, understood in the traditional way. The 
use of particular money species is rooted in the status function which is in turn anchored in 
money emotions, centering around money as a metaphor for social exchange. This anchor 
creates a disposition to use money on the individual level, finding expression in particularly Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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strong evaluations of money. The individual use of money plays together with other uses on 
the population level, which establishes the performativity of the institution of money. 
We can now state that money is a meme, in the specific sense of the causal conjunction of 
certain signs, the money tokens circulating in a population, and the emotion related with so-
cial exchange, i.e. a particular neuronal structure. Interestingly, this structure can be traced 
back to the functioning of genetic evolution as well, as we can safely assume that there is di-
rect phylogenetic line leading from the human ancestors to the modern human species, which 
included the particular somatic structures underlying the emotions of social exchange and 
reciprocity. However, it is not possible to reduce the cultural phenomenon of money to the 
genetic level, but only the underlying human penchant for social exchange. With the emer-
gence of money, a fact on a different ontological level had emerged, which depends on the 
workings of the Searlian status functions. 
As money is related with neuronal patterns underlying social exchange, mutually reinforcing 
causal feedback circuits emerged that further stabilized those human capacities, and open up 
the way for new expressions. Thus, with the diffusion of money its possible use as a transacti-
on device was further strengthened, which in turn changed the context of social exchange to-
wards the settings of more anonymous market-type relations. It is not the evolution of markets 
that required the emergence of money, but to the opposite: The evolutionary emergence of an 
artefact with the properties of  early money made the  further  growth of markets possible, 
which is exactly the shift towards derivative functions of money. We can add that this transi-
tion is the crucial step towards performing a monetary exchange economy, with money beco-
ming an observer relative fact, hence adding to the social ontology. Money as an externaliza-
tion of social exchange emotions allowed for the emergence of new cognitive powers, such as 
the intersubjectively accepted calculation of values. This further enhanced its autonomous 
status in social reality, triggering behavioral innovations which were not possible without its 
existence. 
The naturalistic approach enables us to make sense of the empirical observations about the 
strong emotional components in handling money even in most advanced human societies. 
This does not imply, however, that those components always prevail. The artefact of money 
evolved historically in increasingly complex ways, thus strengthening functional and techno-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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logical interdependencies. Therefore, actual money use today is governed by a mix of deter-
minants, including also the ‘rational’ use of money without significant impact of primordial 
emotions. However, this means that those rational uses of money are not an outcome of the 
rationality of the human agent, but reflect the workings of external artefacts, such as instituti-
ons governing money markets, technologies governing money calculations in accounting, or 
new money artefacts such as electronic money. That is, the proposed perspective on money is 
also an externalist account of economic rationality in the modern uses of money. Evolving 
artefacts may trigger “irrational uses” (such as in the credit card case, Laibson 1997) or “rati-
onal uses” (such as with the evolution of modern accounting systems, see Hatherly at al. 
2008). So, the Darwinian theory of money also fits into the conceptual schemes that are emer-
ging in economic sociology as an extension of social studies on science, especially in the con-
text of social studies on finance (Preda 2008). Here, agency on financial markets is increa-
singly seen as resulting from complex networks of interaction between individual behavior 
and embedding technologies (for pertinent collections of papers, see Callon et al. 2007; Pinch 
and Swedberg 2008). This is just a special expression of the general neuromeme-artefact con-
junction that was identified in this paper. So I expect that the framework can be extended to 
include also more sophisticated institutions in modern finance. 
4  Conclusion and outlook 
I summarize the results of this paper in figure 6, focusing on the replicator-interactor duality, 
and taking a slighly different view on the causal circuitry analyzed in the previous sections. 
The first important insight is that we have to refer the term ‘institution’ to the entire causal 
circuitry, which corresponds to Aoki’s model. This directly implies that we can think of the 
selection of institutions, relative to a particular environment. This selection works via the state 
of nature impact on the outcomes of the interactions within a population that follows an insti-
tution. Treating the institution as the entire causal circuitry corresponds to the type/token dis-
tinction in the relation between the individual and species: The individual corresponds to the 
individual action, and the species corresponds to the population level patterns. Insofar as fol-
lowing an institution is a performative action, the individual action reflects the population-
level patterns, in the same way as the individual reflects the species features, within a range of Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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variation, which, as we have seen for the case of institutions, result from the stochastic rela-
tionship between dispositions and actions. 
Figure 6: The Darwinian approach to institutions 
 
Since selection operates via the outcomes of the interactions, we can identify the realized pat-
terns of behavior on the population level as the interactor in the generalized Darwinian sense. 
This catches the different uses of the term ‘institution’ in the literature, which vascillate be-
tween the rules of the game and the realized equilibria (e.g. Aoki 2001: 24ff.; Dixit 2004: 
5ff.). In my approach, both is true to a certain extent, but more exactly, the game equilibria 
are the interactor (which corresponds to the notion in biology that the interactor is actually 
equal to the selectively relevant behavioral patterns of a species). 
The interactor relates with the replicator via the process of epigenesis (compare Jablonka and 
Lamb 2006). I relate this process directly to the disposition that generates the individual ac-
tions. It is essential to see that this disposition is created by the causal conjunction of the signs 
and the emotions in the replicator. Therefore, the notion of epigenesis captures gene-culture 
co-evolution in the specific sense that the emotions are genetically anchored, but the gene 
expression is always mediated culturally, i.e. via the signs that evolve entirely independently Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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from the genetic level. This extends the notion of epigenesis from somatic mechanisms to 
extra-somatic mechanisms. By implication, it is not possible to reduce observed actions di-
rectly to the genetic basis. This offers a solution to the nature-nurture quandary, as all gene 
expressions are seen as culturally contextualized, such that culture is an ontologically auto-
nomous channel of the transmission of biological information (which matches with approa-
ches such as Richerson and Boyd 2005). 
Thus, institutions build on a new kind of replicator, which, as I have discussed extensively, 
consists of a causal conjunction of signs and neuronal structures. The intricate property of this 
replicator  is  that  the  signs  are  strictly  population  level  phenomena,  whereas  the  neuronal 
structures are strictly individual phenomena. Important properties of the institutional replica-
tor therefore directly relate with the material stability of the signs. Signs change, too, because 
of the population level processes. But it is important to notice that those changes only become 
evolutionarily relevant if they result into altered dispositions which in turn generate actions 
that change the ppoulation level equilibria. It is perfectly possible that a new sign generates 
similar actions and hence reproduces a similar institution. 
In this paper, this model of institutions has been applied on a core institution of ther economy, 
money. My analysis shows that it is necessary to strip institutions of their technical complexi-
ties in modern societies in order to make their evolutionary foundations explicit. The reason 
lies in the reflexivity of status functions, which create new social facts continuously. As we 
have seen in the case of money, this means that money today is a very complex phenomenon, 
with different uses and expressions in different contexts. Money emotions may not count 
much for a central banker.  In my  analysis  I  have not scrutinized the  process of  growing 
complexity in the evolution of institutions, which is often driven by the reflective powers of 
human reason and imagination. However, this is just another reflection of the ontological au-
tonomy of institutions. If we want to understand the fundamentals, we have to go back to the 
prototypical institutions, as I have shown for the case of money. On the other hand, complexi-
ty also means that those institutions also may exert an indirect impact on institutional innova-
tions that connect with them. So, financial markets may bear the imprint of the primordial 
institution of money (which is evident from the many effects of money emotions on their per-
formance). I think that a similar analysis is possible for other primordial institutions, as I have 
argued earlier (Herrmann-Pillath 1994) for the case of property. In standard modelling appro-Naturalizing Institutions: Evolutionary Principles and Application on the Case of Money  
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aches to animal conflicts (the Hawk-Dove game), the so-called Strategy of Bourgeois is evo-
luntionarily stable, which builds on a particular emotional structure, that is, to invest more 
resources into the defense of a territory if one is incumbent than if one is intruder. In human 
culture, this emotional structure has been causally conjoined with the emergence of numerous 
signs that signal the relative positions of incumbents and intruders. This would be the arche-
typical situation of the emergence of private property, akin to my analysis of money in this 
paper. I think that similar evolutionary approaches can be specified for other elementary hu-
man institutions, such as the institutions of cooperation (following Skyrms 2004 and others). 
With relation to the more general problem of the extension of Darwinism into the domain of 
human social systems, this paper has shown that we can draw on more recent abstract refor-
mulations of Darwinism, especially the replicator-interactor duality, in order to achieve a con-
ceptual unification. However, I emphasize that this is only possible if we adopt a radically 
naturalistic ontology which follows the rule that all entities that are posited must have a phy-
sical realization. We may not yet have discovered such realizations, similar to Darwin’s posi-
tion, when genes were still unkown. But we always need to present a reasonable speculation. 
This paper offers a speculation about the physical nature of the replicator in institutional evo-
lution: The causal conjunction of neuronal structures and signs. I think that this hypothesis 
can be also extended into the analysis of human material culture, that is, consumption. This 
raises the additional question how far consumption activities are institutionalized. However, 
the basic point seems promising, namely to analyze the evolution of human consumption pat-
terns in terms of replicators which are ontologically defined as causal conjunctions of emoti-
ons and signs. There is already a growing literature on the Darwinian analysis of consumption 
(e.g. Saad 2007) which makes the accomplishment of this task straightforward. In the end, I 
expect that we will be able to identify a set of universal human emotions that connect with a 
cultural cosmos of signs, that we can further systematicize into different domains of instituti-
ons and economic activities. Whereas the set of emotions is mainly in the state of evolutiona-
ry  stasis,  the  evolution  of  signs  drives  the  continuous  emergence  of  behavioral  novelties, 
which also change the context of the expressions of human biology. 
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